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INTRODUCTION

Electronic discovery (e-discovery) creates issues that are fundamentally different from the issues associated with paper discovery.' In response to these differences, the United States Congress promulgated
the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These
amendments address a number of problems associated with e-discovery; however, they do not address many of the specific problems associated with the attorney-client privilege that arise from large amounts
of electronically stored information (ESI).2 The United States House
of Representatives Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
proposed Rule 502 of Evidence (Rule 502) to address these issues.
Rule 502 addresses the effects of inadvertent disclosures in discovery,
and whether those inadvertent disclosures operate as waivers of the
attorney-client privilege. Unfortunately, the proposed rule does not
address many of the intricate situations that are present in every bankruptcy case.
This Note first examines broadly the scope of ESI and e-discovery
and their effect on the legal field. Next, it discusses generally the attorney-client privilege and how waiver occurs. Then this Note analyzes Rule 502 and how it addresses several problems attorneys
currently face with waiver of the attorney-client privilege in e-discovery. Then, it shows how Rule 502 does not address two specific
problems in the bankruptcy context. Finally, it will offer attorneys a
few suggestions to insure that the client's attorney-client privilege is
preserved.
II.
A.

E-DISCOVERY

Electronically Stored Information

Discovery extends to any information relevant to the claim or defenses of a party or relevant to the subject matter of a dispute that
would likely lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 3 Courts recognized that relevant computerized data is discoverable even before
1. See Timothy J. Chorvat, E-Discovery and Electronic Evidence in the Courtroom: A Primerfor Business Lawyers, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 13.
2. Amy J. Longo & Dale Cendali, Current Trends in Electronic Discovery, ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND DIGITAL DISCOVERY: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGAL, TECHNICAL,

AND

OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

263, 269 (ALI-ABA

Course of Study, May 17-19, 2007), available at http://files.ali-aba.org/old/freearticles/
cm098-course.pdf.
3. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(1).
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the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Ediscovery is often distinguished from other forms of discovery such as
conventional discovery-discovery of information that can be read
without the aid of a computer-and discovery of physical objects or
property.5 E-discovery refers to the discovery of ESI.6 This includes
any "machine-readable electronic information stored on physical media from which it can be retrieved." 7 ESI includes e-mails, web pages,
word processing files, computer databases, or anything that can be
stored in the memory of computers, hard drives, CDs, DVDs, and
flash drives.8
E-discovery differs from traditional forms of discovery in several
ways.9 ESI presents unique possibilities that often lead to significant
problems in the discovery process.1 ° For example, there is a higher
volume of information stored electronically as opposed to the volume
of information stored in paper documents." More than 99 percent of
new information is created and stored electronically. 2 Additionally,
ESI is created and replicated more quickly than paper documents.' 3
In the United States alone, there are an estimated 105 million e-mail
users, who send more than 1.5 billion e-mails daily. 4 That amounts to
approximately 547.5 billion e-mails per year archived electronically.
In the business world, the dramatic increase in e-mail usage alone
poses problems for small and large companies alike. 5 One study
showed that the average employee sends or receives about fifty
messages per working day,' 6 which translates into more than 1.2 mil4. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 463-64 (D. Utah
1985).
5. SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION &
PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION-BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 1

(2d ed. 2007), availableat http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC
_PRINCP 2nd ed 607.pdf [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 11.
8. Id. at 1; BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2007), available at http:I/
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf.
9. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
10. Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *10 (N.D. I1.
May 31, 2002); SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 1; see generally MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
11. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 2; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
12. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3; David K. Ipsom, Electronic Discovery
Primerfor Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2005).
13. Id.
14. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
15. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 2.
16. Press Release, Microsoft, Survey Finds Workers Average Only Three Productive Days Per Week: Most Respondents to New Microsoft Office Survey Say They're
Working Longer, But Are Less Productive; They Relate Their Productivity to Technol-
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lion messages per year for an organization of 100 employees. 17 This
proliferation of ESI has ultimately led to problems with storage because of the increased accumulation of data.1 8 Furthermore, e-mail
software and data transfer systems often create multiple copies of
messages as they are sent and resent. 9 The result is an amount of
relevant information and data that is exponentially greater than that
found through other forms of discovery.
Another significant difference is that ESI is more difficult to permanently dispose of than information recorded in paper documents. 2 °
The fragile nature of paper documents has always been a concern for
lawyers.2 a When paper documents are damaged, altered, or thrown
away, they are usually considered to be undiscoverable because they
a
are no longer available for production. 22 However, with ESI, when
23
file is deleted, it does not necessarily mean that the file is lost.
Moreover, the digital aspect of ESI allows it to be changed easily,
sometimes without human intervention. 24 This creates a unique challenge both practically and ethically. Unlike paper documents, ESI is
not "fixed in a final form. '' 25 ESI can be modified in a number of
different ways. Thus, changes to ESI are sometimes difficult to detect
without the assistance of computer forensic techniques. 26 For example, merely opening a file or changing the location where it is saved
can change the metadata associated with the file.2 7 Metadata, which
many users do not know exists, provides information, such as: when a
file was created, who created it, when it was last edited, what the edits
were, and who edited it.28 Metadata contained in an e-mail can have
over 1,200 properties, including: the date the message was sent, the
date it was received, the date it was replied to, who was blind carbon
copied ("bcc"), and even address book information. 9
ogy, Mar. 5, 2005, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/marO5/03-15three
productivedayspr.mspx.
17. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
18. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining that a few thousand paper
documents used to fill a file cabinet, but now millions of pages of documents can be
stored on hard drives and CDs).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id.; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
22. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that when a file is "deleted" on a computer, the operating system changes the data's entry in the disk directory to a "not used" status, which allows the computer to write over the "deleted"
data. Thus, until the computer writes over the "deleted" data, it can be recovered by
a search of the disk instead of the disk's directory.).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
28. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3; SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 3.
29. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 3.
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One of the largest practical challenges facing attorneys today is determining when metadata is relevant. 30 In some cases, metadata
might resolve a disputed material fact. Absent metadata, some ESI
may be incomprehensible if viewed outside of the environment it was
created in. 3 ' Additionally, the disclosure of metadata raises ethical
issues.32 Even though ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 makes it clear
that there is no ethical obligation to refrain from using metadata embedded in an e-mail,3 3 some states disagree.34 The most common example is the uselessness of a spreadsheet or any other database when
embedded data, such as computational formulas, labels, and columns,
are missing.35
B.

2006 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure

In response to the growing importance of e-discovery, the Judicial
Conference of the United States approved changes to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") "aimed at discovery of electronically stored information. '36 The Supreme Court approved the proposed changes on April 12, 2006, and on December 1, 2006, the
amended rules took effect.3 7 The changes are divided into five categories: (a) amendments to clarify the rules' application to ESI; (b)
amendments requiring attorneys to pay early attention to e-discovery
issues; (c) an amendment requiring attorneys to better manage discovery of ESI that is not reasonably accessible; (d) an amendment setting
out the procedure for the assertion of a privilege after production; and
(e) an amendment clarifying the application of sanctions when spoliation occurs. 3 8 Additionally, Rule 45 was amended to adapt the
changes mentioned above.39

30. Id. at 4.
31. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3; SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 4.
32. Robert L. Kelly, The Tech Side of E-Discovery: Understanding Electronically
Stored Information, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 46.
33. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442
(2006) (discussing the review and use of metadata).
34. Kelly, supra note 32, at 46 (describing how in Alabama and Florida the "mining" of metadata constitutes judicial misconduct).
35. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 4.
36. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3; Judicial Conference Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure, Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 22 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/
ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter JCC Report]; see also SHIRA A. SHEINDLIN, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE E-DISCOVERY: THE NEWLY AMENDED
CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (2006).
37. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.

FEDERAL RULES OF

38. JCC Report, supra note 36, at App. C-18.
39. Id.
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1. Application of Federal Rules to ESI

The amendments made to Rules 26(a) and 34(a)(1) establish that
ESI is a separate category of records that must be addressed in the
initial disclosures and responses to production requests.4 0 These
amendments expand the 1970 "data collections" language to include
data and information of all kinds, "stored in any medium."' 4 1 Another

important addition to Rule 34(a)(1) is the right to "test, or sample any
designated documents of ESI; '4 2 creating another obstacle in discovery.4 3 Rule 34(b) creates the procedure by which the requesting party
can specify what form or forms, including electronic, that it wants the
records produced in. 4 When the requesting party does not specify a
form, Rule 34 provides that the records should be produced
in a form
45

that it is "ordinarily maintained" or "reasonably usable.
2.

Early Attention to E-Discovery Required

Because of the common-law duty to preserve evidence, parties are
obligated to preserve electronic evidence and should focus on this
preservation obligation as early as possible. 46 The amendments to
Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) further this goal by requiring parties to address e-discovery issues early in the litigation process. 47 Rule 16 now

directs the court to address e-discovery issues in its initial scheduling
orders.48 Specifically, Rule 16(b)(5) states that a court should include

in its orders any "provisions for discovery or disclosure of electroni-

cally stored information. '49 Rule 16(b)(6) states that the parties
should disclose "any agreements they reach for asserting a claim of

privilege or of protection for trial-preparation material after production. ' 50 The parties should make the court aware of these topics after
their Rule 26(f) conference. Rule 26(f) now requires that parties dis40. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 20.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 21 & n.94.
43. Id.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b); SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 22.
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii); see, e.g., Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04-3109, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10838, at *8-9 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 8, 2006) (holding that production of TIFF images was "insufficient" and requiring "production in native format because the TIFF documents [did] not contain all of
the relevant, nonprivileged information contained in the designated electronic
media").
46. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f); Creative Sci. Sys. Inc. v. Forex Capital
Mkts., LLC, No. 04-03746, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20116, at *17-20 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
2006) ( holding that "[t]o preserve includes taking steps to prevent the partial or full
destruction, alteration, test, deletion, shredding, incineration, erasing, wiping, relocation, migration, theft or mutation of such material, as well as negligent or intentional
handling that would make material incomplete or inaccessible.").
47. JCC Report supra note 36, at 26.
48. JCC Report, supra note 36, at 26; SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 4.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
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cuss three new topics in their pre-hearing conference: (1) "any issues
relating to the preservation of discoverable information,"5 1 (2) "any
issues relating to disclosure or discovery of ESI, including the form or
forms in which it should be produced,"5 2 and (3) "any issues relating
to claims of privilege or protection of trial-preparation materials." 5 3
3.

Discovery of ESI That Is Not Readily Ascertainable

The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) addresses the scope of information parties must produce in their initial Rule 26(a) disclosures.5 4
This amendment is aimed at the specific problems unique to e-discovery. 55 The new rule creates two tiers of information-accessible and
not reasonably accessible. 56 The amendment requires that a party determine which sources are not reasonably accessible.5 7 Reasonably
accessible sources generally include, but are not limited to, files available on or from a computer user's desktop, or on a company's network used in the ordinary course of operation. 5a Not reasonable
sources generally are those that require a party to incur an undue burden or cost in order to produce relevant, non-privileged information. 9
The rule requires consideration of technological feasibility and realistic costs of preserving, retrieving, reviewing, and producing ESI as
well as the nature of the litigation and amount in controversy. 60 For
example, given today's technology, back-up tapes, legacy data, and
media acquired from another entity in an unsupported format may be
unreasonable sources.6 1
Either party may bring the issue of accessibility to the court's attention, but the parties should make a good-faith effort to resolve the
dispute before seeking the court's intervention.6 2 Regardless of who
files the motion, the burden is on the producing party to demonstrate
that the information is not reasonably accessible. 63 The Sedona Prin51. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(D).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B); SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 14.
55. JCC Report, supra note 36, at 31.
56. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 15.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) ("A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or costs.").
58. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 18.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
60. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 17.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006); see Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Inaccessible data... is not
readily usable. Back-up tapes must be restored using a process similar to that previously described, fragmented data must be de-fragmented, and erased data must be
reconstructed, all before the date is usable. That makes such data inaccessible.").
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B), 26(c)(1).
63. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. A. 04-84, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16662, at *19-20 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2006) (holding that a peculiar
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ciples suggest that when courts and parties are balancing the cost and
burden of producing ESI, they should apply the proportionality standard embodied in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and its state equivalents.64 The
proportionality standard requires a balancing of the need for discovery with the burden imposed." Some of the factors pertinent to electronic discovery are: (a) large volumes of data; (b) data stored in
multiple repositories; (c) complex internal structures of collections of
data and the relationships of one file to another; (d) data in different
formats and coding schemes that may need to be converted into text
to be reviewed; and (e) frequent changes in information technology.66
4.

Assertion of Privilege Post-Production
The amendment to Rule 26(b)(5) addresses the burden and expense
involved with reviewing the exorbitant amounts of ESI by providing a
procedure to retrieve privileged information or work-product materials after they have been produced to the adversary.67 The rule states
that when a party produces information that it claims is privileged, it
must give notice of its claim and the basis for the claim to the party
that received the information. 6 After receiving notice, the receiving
party must return, sequester, or destroy the information, and may not
use or disclose the information to third parties.69 In the alternative,
the receiving party may submit the information to the court, under
seal, to determine if the information is in fact privileged.7" An important thing to note is that this rule does not determine whether such
production constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.7 '
5. Sanctions for Spoliation
Finally, the most debated amendment to the FRCP was Rule 37(f),
which gives limited safe harbor from spoliation sanctions.72 Spoliation
is the "destruction or significant alteration of evidence or the failure
to preserve the property for another's use as evidence in pending or
computer system is no excuse for not producing information and that production must
be made in a reasonably useable form); CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No.
3:04cv2150, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 27053, at *14 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006) ("[T]he fact
that the attachments were created with different software programs" is no excuse for
producing the "e-mails and attachments in a jumbled, disorganized fashion.").
64. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 17.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 19; JCC Report, supra note 36, at 29; see FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Section IV infra for discussion of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502,
which would make such disclosures not a waiver of privilege as long as reasonable
steps were taken to preserve the privilege.
72. SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 24.
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reasonably foreseeable litigation."7 3 Courts have never tolerated spoliation7 4 and the FRCP provides a number of remedies the courts can
use at their discretion.7 5 But the amendment to Rule 37(f) was designed to give limited protection against these types of sanctions because of an inadvertent alteration or deletion that might occur
through the ordinary use of a computer system.7 6 Unless there are
"exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions" under
the Rules if ESI has been lost as a result of the77 "routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.
III.

WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege is "one of the oldest evidentiary privileges in Anglo American Law."' 78 "Its purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice."7 9 Attorney-client privilege requires that legal advice be sought from a professional legal advisor in his capacity
as such, the communications between the client and advisor be made
in confidence, and the client insist the communications be protected
from disclosure unless that protection is waived.8 °
73. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
74. Stephen W. Teppler, Spoliation of Digital Evidence: A Changing Approach to
Challenges and Sanctions, THE ScITECH LAW., Fall 2000, at 20, 21; see also Pastorello

v. City of New York, 2003 WL 1740606 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("It has long been the rule
that spoliators should not benefit from their wrongdoing, as illustrated by that favorite maxim of law 'omnia presummuntur contra spoliaterum.'").
75. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 26(e)(2), 37(b) (giving the court a right to,
among other things, "prohibit evidence, strike the pleadings in whole or in part, dismiss the action or proceeding, or enter default judgment" if a party fails to obey an
order under 26(f), 35, or 37(a)).
76. JCC Report, supra note 36, at 33; SCHEINDLIN, supra note 36, at 25. See also

Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic Material,64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 268 (2001) (noting that "[s]imply turning on a

personal computer might destroy some [electronic] data").
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
78. Vincent S. Walkowiak et al., An Overview of the Attorney-Client Privilege
When the Client is a Corporation,in ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 1 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed.,

2004); see Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).

79. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (holding that "the lawyer-client privilege rests on the
need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out"); Blackburn,
128 U.S. at 470 (holding that "the rule ... is founded upon the necessity, in the
interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed
of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.").

80. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950); Carl G. Roberts, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Amended Federal Discovery Rules, L. PRAC. TODAY, Dec. 2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/
articles/mgt12062.shtml; Vincent S. Walkowiak et al., Loss of Attorney-Client Privilege
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Sound legal advice and advocacy require that the advocate be fully
informed of the client's situation. On the other hand, the ultimate
goal of the adversary system is to discern the truth.8 1 Because the
attorney-client privilege may ultimately suppress relevant information, it must be "strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle."82
A.

FederalRule of Evidence 501

The attorney-client and work-product privileges are governed in the
federal courts by Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 501"). This
rule states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined
83
in accordance with State law.
When Congress adopted the "general mandates" of Rule 501, it
specifically rejected a series of specific privilege rules that the Judicial
Conference of the United States had promulgated.84 By doing so,
Congress "left the law of privilege in its present state and further provided that privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of
the United States under
a uniform standard applicable both in civil
85
and criminal cases.",
B.

Inadvertent Waiver

Privilege can be lost when an attorney inadvertently discloses documents to opposing counsel or a third party. Inadvertent production of
privileged material is generally regarded as a waiver issue. 86 "Waiver
Through Inadvertent Disclosure of PrivilegedDocuments, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 313,
315 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 2004).
81. See Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 315.
82. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at
542 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 236
(D. Md. 2005) (holding that the attorney-client privilege should not be construed
more broadly than necessary to effectuate its purpose).

83.

FED.

R. EVID. 501.

84. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1996).

85. See

FED.

R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.

86. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 315, 324; see also Goldsborough v. Eagle
Crest Partners, Ltd., 805 P.2d 723 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), affid, 838 P.2d 1069 (1992);
George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss1/4
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[is] an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege, 8 7 but in reality, the courts will look at the actor's intent. 8
When an actor's conduct is objectively inconsistent with the acts usually associated with protecting the privilege, an implied waiver occurs.89 The amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)
does not address the substantive question of whether a party waives
its privilege when it inadvertently discloses privileged information; it
merely sets out a procedure for what to do when such an act occurs. 90
Currently, courts do no agree on a single approach for determining
91 Historically, courts have applied one
whether the privilege was lost.92
approaches.
of three different
1.

Strict-Accountability Approach

The "strict-accountability" approach reasons that any disclosure,
even if it was inadvertent, waives the privilege. 93 The justification for
the approach is that once the information is disclosed it cannot be
undisclosed, because after disclosure, it is impossible to achieve the
benefits of the privilege. 94 Some courts favor the "strict-accountability" approach because inadvertent waiver is "merely a euphemism"
for negligence, and "certainly ...one is expected to pay a price for
one's negligence." 9 5
Perhaps the most persuasive reason courts have chosen the strictaccountability approach is because it encourages self-regulatory behavior. 96 For example, in In re Sealed Case, the court explained that
even though the attorney-client privilege is of "continuing importance," the party asserting the privilege must make sure to guard
L. REV. 637 (1986); Wesley M. Ayres, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The
Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J.
OR.

59 (1986).
87. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
88. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 316.
89. See Chic. Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (Ct. App.
1985).
90. Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 233 (D. Md. 2005).
91. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 316; Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment,
Making a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-Client Privilege and Inadvertent Disclosure,26 CAP. U. L. REV. 347, 359 (1997).

92. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 316; Jonathan M. Redgrave & Kristin M.
Nimsiger, Electronic Discovery and Inadvertent Productionsof Privileged Documents,
49 FED. LAW., July 2002, at 37, 39.

93. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Wichita Land &
Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992); Harmony
Gold USA Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 116-17 (N.D. 111. 1996); FDIC v.
Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992).
94. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich.
1954); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
95. In re Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
96. See Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 317; Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980.
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against waiver. 97 "In other words, if a client wishes to preserve the
privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels-if not crown jewels." 98
While this approach arguably is the most consistent with the waiver
rules that are typically applied at trial, 99 many courts have refused to
apply the doctrine because it is too harsh." ° These courts argue that
this approach "sacrifices the value of protecting the client for the sake
of certainty of results." ' Additionally, courts have criticized this approach because of its "pronounced inflexibility and significant intru10 2
sion on the attorney-client relationship.'
2.

Subjective-Intent Approach

The subjective-intent approach is at the other end of the strictness
spectrum.' 0 3 This approach and its several variations focus on the client's intent to waive the privilege.' 0 4 As long as the client did not
intend to waive the privilege, the privilege is preserved." 5 Under this
approach, an inadvertent disclosure only waives a client's privilege if
the client or attorney was grossly negligent.10 6 One court applying this
approach reasoned that, "inadvertent production is the antithesis of
an intentional relinquishment of a known right."1 0 7 Moreover, if the
privilege is for the benefit and welfare of the client, then more than
the attorney's negligence should be necessary in order for the party's
privilege to be lost. 10 8
While this approach may be preferable to the strict approach when
discovery involves several thousand documents, it is often criticized
because it gives more credence to subjective considerations instead of
objective evaluations. 0 9 Further, other courts have expressed a belief
that the lenient subjective-intent approach does not encourage tight
control over privileged documents. 110
97. See Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (holding that the court will grant no greater
protection to those who assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Julrik Prods., Inc. v. Chester, 113 Cal. Rptr. 527, 530 (Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that if any attorney's client is asked a question that would invade the privilege, the attorney's failure to object timely results in a loss of the privilege).
100. See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996).
101. Id.; Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 318.
102. Gray, 86 F.3d at 1483; Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 318.
103. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 318.
104. Id.
105. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 411 (D.N.J. 1995);
Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990).
106. Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 235-36 (D. Md. 2005); Ayres,
supra note 86, at 74.
107. See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
108. Id.
109. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 318.
110. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996).
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3.

Balancing Test

The third approach rejects both extremes and instead evaluates
each situation individually to determine whether a waiver occurred.' 1 1
This approach evaluates the unique circumstances of each case to determine whether reasonable steps were taken to preserve the privilege. 1 2 Like the subjective-intent approach, the balancing approach
focuses on the knowledge and intent of the actor in order to judge
whether the act constituted an effective waiver. In this way, the theory is similar to tort law, which requires a higher threshold for liability
than "mere negligence."1'13 This approach recognizes that mistakes
happen and encourages parties to take steps in anticipation. However, when the reviewing judge finds that the party's pre-disclosure
disclosure is deemed intentional, and a
acts were grossly negligent,1 the
14
constructive waiver occurs.
Courts adopting this approach consider five factors: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2)
the time to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the
extent of the disclosure; and (5) the overreaching issue of fairness.1 15
Because courts have given different weight to each of the five factors,
no generalizations can be made about the weight or necessity of any
of the factors.' 1 6 To illustrate, in Lois Sportswear, the court sustained
the privilege because all the factors weighed in favor of the defendant. 117 Conversely, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey,' 18 the court
found waiver even though the error was rectified quickly because reasonable precautions were not taken and the scope of discovery was
limited. 9 The court in Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania
House Group12 0 began its analysis with a presumption that an inadvertent disclosure led to waiver, and then used the five factors to determine whether the privilege was preserved. 12' Applying the factors,
the court found that the large scope of the discovery did not weigh in
111. Roberts, supra note 80, at 5; Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 236.
112. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 319; Roberts, supra note 80, at 5;
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
TRINE 442-43 (5th ed. 2007).

EDNA

Doc-

113. Roberts, supra note 80, at 5.
114. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 236; Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp.
404, 410-11 (D.N.J. 1995);
115. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 648 (S.D. Ind.
2000); Gray, 83 F.3d at 1483-84; Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th
Cir. 1993); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 319; Redgrave & Nimsiger, supra
note 92, at 38.
116. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 319.
117. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
118. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
119. Id. at 328.
120. Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C.
1987).
121. See id. at 51.
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favor of the defendants because they were not under any time constraints.122 Further, despite the fact that the defendants discovered
the disclosure quickly and attempted to retrieve the documents, the
court found that these factors were outweighed by the fact that the
1 23
disclosure was complete, and confidentiality could not be restored.
When confidentiality is lost, a very strong showing from the other factors must occur. 1 24 Because the defendants 2did
not make such a show5
ing, the court found that waiver occurred.
The growing trend in cases across the nation is to follow this balancing test 126 because it strikes "the appropriate balance between protecting [the] attorney-client privilege and allowing, in certain
situations, the unintended release of privileged documents to waive
that privilege.' 1 27 In Gray v. Bicknell, the Eighth Circuit looked at all
three approaches and found that the balancing test was "best suited"
for achieving a fair result. 128 This approach leaves the court with
broad discretion to determine whether a waiver occurred, and if so,
what the scope of the waiver is.129
Like the other two approaches, the balancing test is criticized be130
cause of its uncertainty and the wide discretion given to judges.
Even so, it allows for the inevitable error that occurs in today's document-intensive litigation system, but still punishes carelessness and
negligence.

3

C. Scope of Waiver

A decision that an inadvertent disclosure resulted in waiver of the
disclosed documents can lead to waiver of all other communications
with the same subject matter. 32 Like determining the effect of an
inadvertent disclosure, courts are split on the scope of the waiver
when an inadvertent disclosure occurs. Some courts have held that
even if the disclosure results in a waiver, it waives only the privilege to
the disclosed documents. 133 Other courts have held that an inadver122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 52 (relying on Hartford, 109 F.R.D. at 330).
125. Id.
126. Redgrave & Nimsiger, supra note 92, at 38.
127. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996).
128. Id.
129. Id.; Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 321.
130. Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 321.
131. Gray, 86 F.3d at 1484; Walkowiak et al., supra note 80, at 321.
132. Kenneth S. Brown & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in
the Federal Courts: A Proposalfor a FederalRule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV.
211, 224 (2006).
133. See generally Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co.,
132 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (applying both the "strict approach" and the "balancing approach" to find waiver, but limiting the waiver to actual documents produced);
Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988) (apply-
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tent waiver waives the privilege as to all communications of the same
subject matter, 134 while still 13other
courts base their determination on
5
the fairness to both parties.
D.

Quick-Peek and Claw-Back Agreements

In light of the uncertainty resulting from inadvertent disclosures
and the increasing amount of information demanded through discovery, courts are encouraging attorneys to enter into non-waiver agreements. 136 In fact, the 2006 amendments to FRCP 16 and 26 encourage
the use of non-waiver agreements to facilitate discovery. 137 Under
these non-waiver agreements, attorneys agree not to assert waiver of
privilege or work-product protection if the opposing party agrees to
expedite ESI production without first doing a "full-fledged privilege
review. ' 13 1 Courts approved non-waiver agreements far before the
2006 amendments.1 39 With the FRCP now encouraging non-waiver
agreements, their use can be expected to increase in the coming
years. 4 °
One type of non-waiver agreement attorneys commonly enter into
is a quick-peek agreement. Under a quick-peek agreement, the responding party provides the requested material without a thorough
review for privilege or protection, but with the explicit understanding
that production does not waive privilege or protection.141 Thus, there
is a "purposeful disclosure of information, 'without intending to waive
ing the "strict approach" to determine waiver occurred but limiting the waiver to the
document disclosed); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that the general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific communication but the also the subject matter of it
in other communications is not appropriate in the case of inadvertent disclosure, unless it is obvious a party is attempting to gain an advantage).
134. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying the "strict
approach" to find waiver and noting that "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege,
it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communication like jewels-if not
crown jewels.").
135. See United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that implied
waiver analysis should be guided by fairness principles); In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
341 F.3d 331, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that a party waived the attorney-client
privilege to the whole subject matter when he used part but not all of a disclosed
matter to its advantage); EPSTEIN, supra note 112, at 595.
136. See

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)

§ 11.446 (2004).

137. See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 234 (D. Md. 2005); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 16 (noting that agreed-on procedures under Rules 16
and 26 are favored over rule-based ones).
138. Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 234.
139. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 11-12 (D. Mass. 2000); Ames v. Black
Entm't Television, No. 98 CIV0226, 1998 WL 812051, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18,
1998); Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 439 (D.D.C. 1984); W. Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. Wyo. 1984); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61
F.R.D. 35, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
140. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 235.
141. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 14.
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a claim of privilege,' prior to production with an express reservation
of the right to assert privilege at a later point in the discovery process." 142 The advisory committee's note to Rule 26(f) clarifies the
process. The responding party provides the requested material for an
"initial examination," after which the requesting party "designates the
documents it wishes to have actually produced. ' 143 The responding
party then screens the designated
documents for formal production
144
and makes any privilege claims.
Another common non-waiver agreement is the claw-back agreement. Under this type of agreement, the responding party reviews the
material requested for privilege or protection before it is produced. If
privileged or protected information is inadvertently disclosed, the parties agree to a procedure for the return of 145
the information within a
reasonable amount of time of its discovery.
E.

Selective Waiver

Selective waiver is a distinctive type of waiver that arises generally
146
when a party is forced to turn over documents to the government.
Under this specific waiver, the privilege is waived as to the government but not to other parties. However, only the Eighth Circuit and
some district courts in other circuits have upheld the principle. 147 The
First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits
have held that when privileged information is disclosed to a federal
agency, the attorney-client privilege is lost to all parties. 148 Furthermore, the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the privilege
is lost even in the presence of confidentiality agreements such as clawbacks and quick-peeks. 4 9
502
Proposed Rule 502 to the Federal Rules of Evidence resolves two
major problems that occur in the waiver context. Specifically, the rule
addresses: (1) the effect of certain disclosures of communication or
information protected by attorney-client privilege or work product;
and (2) the increasing costs associated with protecting against waiver
in light of electronic discovery. 150 Ultimately, the rule seeks to proIV.

PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

142. Ken Withers, Two Tiers and a Safe Harbor:Federal Rulemakers Grapple with
E-Discovery, 51 FED. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 29, 36.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note, available at http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/EDiscovery wNotes.pdf.
144. Id.
145. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 14-15; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
146. EPSTEIN, supra note 112, at 492-93.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Brown & Capra, supra note 132, at 229.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note.
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vide a "predictable, uniform set of standards under which parties can
determine the consequences of a disclosure of a communication or
information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection. "151
A.

Background

On January 23, 2006, the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Chair
of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
wrote a letter to the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts requesting that the Judicial Conference "initiate a rule-making
on forfeiture of privileges."1 5 The Congressman explained that he
was informed that an absence of clarity on the subject, particularly as
it pertains to the attorney-client privilege, was causing significant disruption and cost to the litigation process. 15 3 He urged the Judicial
Conference to adopt a rule providing clarity that would:
protect against the forfeiture of privileges where a disclosure is the
result of an innocent mistake; permit parties and courts, to protect
against the consequences of waiver by permitting disclosures of
privileged information between the parties to a litigation; and allow
persons and entities to cooperate with the government agencies by
turning over privileged information without
waiving all privileges as
1 54
to other parties in subsequent litigation.
In response to this letter, the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Advisory Committee") drafted
proposed Rule 502 for hearings and comments. 5 5 These hearings occurred at Fordham University on April 24 and 25, 2006.156 A revised
version of Proposed Rule 502 was approved by the Advisory Committee at its June 22-23, 2006 meeting. 157 On September 27, 2007, the
Judicial Conference of the United States submitted the revised version
of Proposed Rule 502 to both the Senate's and House of Representatives's Committee on the Judiciary. 158 On December 11, 2007, Pro151. Id.
152. Brown & Capra, supra note 132, at 246; Ashish Prasad & Vazantha Meyers,
The PracticalImplications of Proposed Rule 502, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 133, 135 (2007).
153. Prasad & Meyers, supra note 152, at 135.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Honorable Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, and Honorable Arlen Specter,
Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Sept. 26, 2007) (on file with
author), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Hill Letter re EV 502.pdf; Letter
from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Honorable Lamar
Smith, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representa-
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posed Rule 502 was introduced on the floor of the Senate as Senate
Bill 2450.159
B.

Proposed Rule 502160

Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations
on Waiver
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to
disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection.
(a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope of a Waiver. When the disclosure is made
in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency and
waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection,
the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a Federal or State proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a Federal proceeding
or to a Federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate
as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable
steps to prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).
(c) Disclosure Made in a State Proceeding. When the disclosure
is made in a State proceeding and is not the subject of a Statecourt order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as
a waiver in a Federal proceeding if the disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made
in a Federal proceeding; or
(2) is not a waiver under the law of the State where the disclosure occurred.
(d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A Federal court may
order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure
connected with the litigation pending before the court-in which
tives (Sept. 26, 2007) (on file with author), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
HillLetter reEV502.pdf.
159. S. 2450, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?
c110:4/temp/-c110Fx1YT3.
160. For an in-depth look at the several drafts of Proposed Rule 502 and how it has
been modified from its original drafting see Brown & Capra, supra note 132, at
247-49.
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event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other Federal or
State proceeding.
(e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on
the effect of disclosure in a Federal proceeding is binding only on
the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court
order.
(f) Controlling Effect of This Rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101
and 1101, this rule applies to State proceedings and to Federal
court-annexed and Federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if State law provides the rule
of decision.
(g) Definitions. In this rule:
(1) "attorney-client privilege" means the protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications; and
(2) "work-product protection" means the protection that applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible
equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
C.

Disclosures Made in Federal Proceedings or
to a Federal Office or Agency

Subsection (a) states that a voluntary disclosure made in a federal
proceeding or to a federal office or agency, if a waiver, generally will
result only in a waiver of the communication or information disclosed.1 61 Thus, subject matter waiver will occur only when fairness
requires "a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to
the disadvantage of the adversary. ' 162 Consequently, an inadvertent
disclosure of protected information will never result in a subject matter waiver because it is not an act meant to intentionally mislead opposing counsel.' 63 In this way, Rule 502 contradicts the result in In re
Sealed Case'6 4 where the District of Columbia Circuit held that an
inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery automatically
constituted a subject matter waiver. 1 65 Additionally, to provide protection and predictability, Subsection (a) provides that if a disclosure
is made at the federal level, the federal rule on subject matter will
govern subsequent
state court determinations on the scope of the
6
waiver.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

16

R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note subdiv. (a).
Id.
Id.
In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note subdiv. (a).
Id.
FED.
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Inadvertent Waiver

Subsection (b) attempts to create a uniform position regarding
whether an inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege
or work-product protection.1 6 7 Proposed Rule 502 would adopt the
"balancing approach"' 16 taken by several courts, which holds that an
inadvertent disclosure does not operate as a waiver if the holder took
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and rectify the error. 169 While
the five-factor test 170 is not explicitly codified, the advisory note explains that the rule is "flexible enough to accommodate any of those
listed factors.' 17 ' Furthermore, the advisory note mentions that other
considerations bearing on the reasonableness of a producing party's
of documents to be
efforts, such as time constraints and the number
72
reviewed, may be taken into consideration.'
V.

PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9017 states that all federal
rules of evidence apply in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy proceedings are
unique because of the increased demands for disclosure. Bankruptcy
law creates a number of situations where an attorney or trustee can
waive the attorney-client privilege. 7 3 There will be some sort of
transfer of ESI in practically every bankruptcy case. 174 Nevertheless,
waiver of the attorney-client privilege is most likely to occur from the
attorney's actions. Although it is often stated that an attorney cannot
unilaterally waive the attorney-client privilege, the above discussion
shows how inadvertent disclosures of privileged information can
167. See Section III(b)(ii) supra for a discussion of the different approaches courts
have taken to analyze this question.
168. See Section III(b)(iii) supra for a discussion of the balancing approach.
169. FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note subdiv. (b); see also Section
IIL(b)(ii)(3) supra for a discussion of the balancing test approach and its application in
various courts.
170. See Section III(b)(iii) supra (courts that adopted the "middle-ground" approach have used a five factor analysis: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time to rectify the error; (3) the scope
of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the overreaching issue of
fairness ). See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
171. FED. R. EvID. 502 advisory committee's note subdiv. (b).
172. Id.
173. See Micheal Fielding & Jack Seward, You Need to Know This: Bankruptcy and
Attorney-Client Privilege in the ElectronicAge, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 63 ("Examples [of disclosures of privileged communications] include: § 363 sales, liquidations,
cancellations/return of leased computers and digital electronic equipment; contracted
'outsourced' accounting and financial operations, production of electronically created,
stored and shared information in an adversary proceeding, turnover of property of the
estate, and turnover by a custodian.").
174. Id.
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quickly lead to waiver. 175 Proposed Rule 502 attempts to remedy this
problem, but it does not take into account at least three specific
problems that arise in the bankruptcy context. First, is the U.S. Trustee a federal officer, and if so, is a disclosure to the trustee protected
by the Proposed Rule 502? Second, is the initial meeting of creditors
required by Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code 176 a federal proceeding that would receive the protection granted under Proposed Rule
502? Finally, are disclosures to the various committees 177 covered by
the rule?
A.

Disclosures to the U.S. Trustee and 341 Meetings

Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code requires that "within a reasonable time" after a person or company has filed for bankruptcy, the
United States Trustee shall hold a meeting of the creditors. 1 78 Further, section 343 requires that, at these meetings, the debtor appear
and submit to an examination.1 79 The examination is governed by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure ("FRBP") 2004, which states:
"the examination... of the debtor under section 343 of the Code may
relate to the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the
administration of the debtor's estate [.],18o Certainly, voluntary disclosures by the debtor during this meeting would waive privilege.
However, Subsection (c) of Rule 2004 allows for documents and testimony to be subpoenaed pursuant to FRBP 9016.181 If a debtor is
called upon to testify about confidential conversations he may have
had with his attorney-privileged conversations-would Rule 502 apply in these situations?
The purpose of the 341 meeting is to determine whether assets have
been concealed and whether there has been any improper disposition
of assets. 82 Debtors will certainly argue that the 341 meeting is a federal proceeding because it is required under federal law and is administered by the United States Trustee. The Office of the United States
Trustee is a division of the Department of Justice;' 83 and consequently, any meeting he presides over is a federal proceeding. Conversely, the trustee might argue that since the 341 meeting is not a
Part VII adversary proceeding or a contested matter governed by
175. See Section III(b) supra.
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2000).

177. Id. § 1102.

178. Id. § 341(a).

179. Id. § 343.

180. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b).
181. Id. § 2004(c).

182. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 341.02[51[d] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2008).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (2000) (explaining that the Attorney General shall appoint
the United States Trustee for Federal Judicial districts set out in the statute).
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FRBP 9014 that neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. 184 Furthermore, such privilege is
not necessary because the sworn testimony and evidence gathered at a
direct evidence in a later adversary
341(a) meeting is not admissible as
185
proceeding or contested matter.
B.

Disclosure to the 1102 Creditor Committee

Similarly, the Code provides that "as soon as practicable after the
order for relief under Chapter 11 of this title, the United States Trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured
claims."1'8 6 The committee's purpose is to represent the interests of
the unsecured creditors. The Code gives these committees the ability
to "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan."' 8 7 But like the
341 meeting, it is unclear whether the 1102 committee will be considered a federal agency or office for purposes of proposed rule 502.188
VI.

A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Adequate Knowledge of E-Discovery and ESI

In order to prevent the waiver of attorney-client privilege, attorneys
must gain an understanding of e-discovery and ESI and acknowledge
that these are a crucial part of most lawsuits today. "An attorney now
risks committing malpractice if he or she does not adequately understand how electronic information is created, stored, and communicated.' 1 89 Attorneys must know how ESI is created, how it is used,
90
and most importantly how it may be obtained through discovery.'
In a recent decision from the Southern District of New York, the court
found that a law firm committed "gross negligence" when it failed to
find its client's ESI.' 9' The court ordered both the firm and the defendants to pay monetary sanctions.' 92 This decision should serve as a
184. See Chapter 7 Trustee Manual 72 (2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/privatetrustee/library/chapter07/index.htm (follow hyperlink to "Handbook, July 2002" [PDF
format]); David S. Kennedy, Vanessa A. Lantin & Alissa York, Professionalism:Dealing with UnprofessionalConduct in Bankruptcy, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 575, 618 (2006).
185. Kennedy, Lantin & York, supra note 184, at 618.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
187. Id. § 1103(c)(2).
188. Lee Barrett, Bankruptcy Secrets and Proposed FRE 502, ST. B. OF TEX.
BANKR. L. SEC. NEWSL., Summer 2007, at 4, 10, availableat http://www.texasbar.com/
bankruptcy/Newsletter Summer2007.pdf.
189. Fielding & Seward, supra note 173, at 1.
190. Id. at 65.
191. See Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB), 2006 WL
1409413, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
192. Id.
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warning to all attorneys who might rely on their client's representation that there is no ESI, that such reliance will not serve as an adequate excuse for waiver of the privilege.
B.

Adequate Knowledge of Attorney-Client Privilege
in the E-Discovery Context

In order for bankruptcy attorneys to protect the attorney-client
privilege, they must understand how it operates and the intricacies of
how it may be waived. This understanding includes a comprehensive
knowledge of how the privilege operates specifically within the bankruptcy context, and how the various rules of evidence, procedure, and
bankruptcy procedure affect the privilege.
C.

Reasonable Steps to Protect Privilege

To insure that the attorney-client privilege is preserved, attorneys
should follow several steps and procedures. Attorneys responding to
discovery should follow reasonable procedures to protect privileges in
connection with the production of ESI.' 9 3 The amendments to FRCP
16 and 26 require attorneys to address the effects of inadvertent disclosure early in discovery; 194 thus, at the very least, attorneys should
discuss with opposing counsel the use of claw-back and quick-peek
agreements. 19 5 But as the decision in Phoenix Four suggests, entering
into these agreements is not always enough. 196 Attorneys must be diligent in setting up procedures to ensure that their clients' office files
and communications are protected-not only from outside intrusion,
but from technology risks inside the firm.1 97 These procedures should
include policies for reviewing documents for privileged information to
ensure that the risk of inadvertent disclosure is minimized as much as
possible. 198 "In short, attorneys must act as if the 'strict test' to inadvertent disclosure applies."' 199
VII.

CONCLUSION

Electronically stored information is becoming an increasingly prevalent part of every lawsuit. Every attorney must now be aware of the
unique challenges that e-discovery creates. Consequently, every law193. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 51.
194. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv) (requiring that courts include any agree-

ments the parties reach in its scheduling orders); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(4) (requiring
parties to discuss issues relating to claims of privilege and disclosure).

195. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION 4, 8-9 (2006), available at http://www.nesconline.org/
WC/Publications/CS_ElDiscCCJGuidlines.pdf.
196. See Phoenix Four, 2006 WL 1409413, at *9.
197. Fielding & Seward, supra note 173, at 66.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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suit is now presented with new challenges. Because of these challenges, the Rules Committee promulgated the 2006 amendments to
the FRCP. While these rules acknowledge many of the unique situations and challenges that e-discovery and ESI create, much work is
still needed to address how the long-standing rules that govern practice apply to present-day fact patterns. Proposed Rule of Evidence
502 attempts to address one distinctive problem that occurs within the
attorney-client privilege context-the increased chance of inadvertent
disclosure from the vast increase in documents and information.
While this rule will undoubtedly have a great impact on the practice of
law, attorneys practicing bankruptcy should be especially leery of relying on the new rule. Because it is not yet clear what effect the application of this rule will have on certain areas and provisions of the
bankruptcy code, attorneys would be wise to institute and follow the
principles discussed above.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol15/iss1/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V15.I1.3

24

